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IMPORTANT EXPLANATORY REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide an overview of shale gas development in the 
USA and to assess the implications of findings with regard to the prospects for 
shale gas development in the EU by 2020-2030. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the environmental and social aspects of market-scale extraction of shale gas. Any 
purely technological, techno-economic and regulatory aspects of shale gas 
exploitation are beyond the scope of this study. Other European Commission 
services, such as DG for Energy (ENER), DG for the Environment (ENV), DG for 
Climate Action (CLIMA), and the Joint Research Centre itself have already 
performed or are currently undertaking in-depth analyses of those aspects of shale 
gas.  
 
The analysis is based on a critical review of a number of literature sources, 
complemented by the authors’ analysis. Bibliographical references for literature, or 
other sources where more information can be found on a given subject, are shown 
in square brackets []. For the sake of simplicity, these references are numbered, 
although the data and information sources themselves are listed in alphabetical 
order. 
 
Most of the background data and information were collected from publicly available 
sources during the period June-November 2011. The study was finalised in January 
2012. Input to the report was provided by the European Integration & Regional 
Competitiveness Foundation, Sofia, Bulgaria under Fee-Paid Contract No. 
P2011017990KAVA / 14.09.2011. 
 
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the following individuals, listed in 
alphabetical order, for their contribution: Jens Bartholmes (JRC), Constantin 
Ciupagea (JRC), Steven Eisenreich (JRC), Florence Limet (DG ENV), Marcelo Masera 
(JRC), Jens Otto (JRC), and Mihai Tomescu (DG ENV). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
The growing geopolitical concentration of conventional reserves of oil and gas in the 
hands of a small number of countries has heightened concerns about the security, 
reliability and affordability of energy supply worldwide. The risk of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum becoming a gas cartel, with a largely overlapping 
membership with the oil cartel, OPEC, has further spurred the search for alternative 
unconventional gas deposits. Amongst the different forms of unconventional gas, 
the greatest progress to date has been made on shale gas, thanks to major techno-
economic breakthroughs in the US and the potential for exploitation elsewhere. 
 
The impetus for and rapid development of the US shale gas industry is attributable 
to a suite of factors, including: 1) Good geological knowledge, which saved on 
costs; 2) Long experience with shale gas exploration and exploitation, which led to 
a step change in extraction technologies and economics; 3) Relatively low 
population densities that allowed for intensive drilling across vast areas; 4) Private 
property status of underground resources, which encouraged landowners to support 
shale gas; 5) A diversified and highly competitive energy sector accommodating a 
number of smaller and independent venture companies that continuously refined 
shale gas technology, along with a large number of service companies; 6) Various 
regulatory and tax incentives; and 7) A liberalised gas market, where every 
developer had access to pipeline capacity to sell its gas. Growing security and 
diversity of supply concerns and rising gas prices were also instrumental. 
 
The rapid expansion of the US shale gas sector has spurred interest for shale gas 
development in other regions possessing shale deposits, including the EU. At the 
same time, concerns regarding the broader economic, environmental and social 
implications of developing a domestic shale gas industry have come to the fore.  
 
Many of the factors for success in the US may be drawbacks in Europe. The key 
disadvantages appear to be the high population densities, the scarcity of innovative 
smaller players in the EU energy sector and the shortage of drilling equipment and 
trained staff. The geological knowledge at EU level is fragmented, and the geology 
itself seems to present more of a challenge than in the US. Experience of shale gas 
exploitation is very limited. As underground resources are the exclusive property of 
national governments, private initiatives are discouraged. The EU gas market and 
pipeline infrastructure is still largely monopolised by large companies that dominate 
the EU energy sector. EU gas imports are becoming increasingly diversified in a 
situation of lower gas prices. The shale gas potential in the EU is generally 
estimated as moderate, possibly compensating for declining indigenous 
conventional production. EU shale gas will also be more expensive than US shale 
gas as well as other feasible alternatives for the import of conventional and 
unconventional gas supply (e.g. from Arctic deposits).  
 
The potential environmental externalities of current extraction technologies for 
shale gas are often viewed as the main threat to the future of the shale gas 
industry. The most important environmental concerns regarding shale gas 
production appear to be associated with water. They are the following: 1) Large 
freshwater demand. Although the absolute pressure of shale gas extraction on total 
water resources may be modest, it could become severe in regions that are already 
experiencing water deficits. This is particularly important for the EU, where water 
availability per capita is relatively low; 2) Contamination of freshwater, mostly by 
methane and fine particles; 3) Underground and surface pollution by hazardous 
chemicals, which are used as fracturing agents, and/or with heavy metals and 
radioactive elements mobilized by fracturing water; 4) Wastewater handling, 
treatment and disposal. The sustainable management of freshwater resources and 
wastewater streams requires an excellent knowledge of geology, prudent 
exploitation of shale gas deposits, full and complete disclosure of the chemical 
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components that are employed, cautious land-use planning, stringent building and 
operational standards, and strict governmental control over operational safety and 
security. 
 
Apart from water, other potential environmental  conflicts of industrial exploitation 
of shale gas include: 1) Visual landscape disturbance; 2) Impacts on biodiversity 
and natural conservation, particularly potential conflicts with Natura 2000; 3) 
Higher noise levels; 4) Worsened local air quality; and 5) Seismic concerns. 
 
The greenhouse gas performance of shale gas is generally poorer than that of 
conventional gas, but may be better than that of coal in favourable circumstances. 
This is largely due to fugitive methane emissions. There are cost-efficient 
techniques, such as flaring and capturing (better), which can significantly reduce 
fugitive emissions. Maintaining high building, operational and post-operational 
conservation standards is crucial, not only for cutting greenhouse gas emissions, 
but also for limiting and eliminating other environmental externalities of shale gas 
exploration and exploitation. 
 
The application of state-of-the-art technologies or alternative shale gas extraction 
technologies, such as using liquefied petroleum gas or liquefied carbon dioxide and 
nitrogen instead of water as a fracturing method, may mitigate some, but not all of 
these environmental challenges. However, these novel technologies are still at the 
very early stages of development, and may bring other challenges, such as serious 
safety and security hazards or a worsening in greenhouse gas performance. In any 
event, given the typical long lead times for new technologies (e.g. it took 
approximately 40 years for shale gas to commercialise), these new technologies 
may not reach industrial-scale application by 2030 – which is the time horizon of 
this study - at least in the EU. 
 
The socio-economic impacts of shale gas development, such as job creation, should 
always be the subject of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case 
basis, taking all direct and indirect consequences into account, whether they be 
positive or negative. Since there is no industrial-scale production of shale gas in the 
EU at present, drawing up quantitative projections about their related potential 
socio-economic impacts is extremely challenging. Direct extrapolation of the North 
American experience does not appear to be trustworthy, because of the large 
differences in geological, economic, social and regulatory conditions. Finally, not 
many genuinely independent and reliable analyses on the social consequences of 
shale gas exploitation were encountered in the course of the study. 
 
Although the prospects for large-scale indigenous production of shale gas in the EU 
are uncertain, the EU can still benefit from shale gas. The EU is already benefiting 
from the shale gas boom in the US through the increased supply of liquefied natural 
gas, which was originally destined for the US, and improved contractual conditions 
for pipeline imports. A new generation of technologies for shale gas exploitation at 
lower costs and with smaller environmental footprints could also make indigenous 
shale gas deposits in the EU attractive in the longer term, beyond 2030. European 
energy companies may also wish to investigate options for prospective shale gas 
acquisitions outside Europe. 
 
From the research point of view, the priority issues that need to be addressed in 
the EU in the short-to-medium term include improved mapping of shale gas 
resources across Europe and determination of: the extent to which the application 
of best available technologies and practices can mitigate key environmental 
concerns with hydraulic fracturing, in particular with regard to water use and 
pollution; potential social and economic costs and benefits of shale gas 
development; and the overall economic feasibility of shale gas development when 
using best available technologies. 
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1. BACKGROUND: WHY SHALE GAS BECAME A TOPICAL ISSUE  
 
The highly volatile world oil and gas prices over the past few years have 
reawakened concerns about the security, reliability and affordability of energy 
supply worldwide. Global energy markets have gradually become extremely 
sensitive to events that sometimes have little to do with the energy sector. The 
supply of core energy products (oil, gas, coal) is becoming concentrated in the 
hands of a very limited number of countries. A large number of major energy-
supplying countries are experiencing levels of political instability and varying 
degrees of unpredictability. 
 
The geopolitical situation regarding gas supply is becoming particularly complicated. 
Although gas is more geographically dispersed than oil, the concentration of gas 
reserves is higher. While Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Iran – the "top three" in the 
world in terms of oil reserves – account for 44% of global oil reserves, Russia, Iran 
and Qatar (the top three in gas reserves) actually control 53% of global gas 
reserves [6]. Iran is amongst the leaders in terms of both oil and gas reserves, with 
10% and 16% of global reserves respectively. Given recent trends, Russia, Iran and 
Qatar might be the only large suppliers of gas worldwide by 2030. The geopolitical 
implications of such a scenario could be extremely challenging, especially in the 
light of the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the ongoing reconsideration of nuclear 
power in Europe and worldwide. 
 
The market situation for gas was further complicated by the creation in 2001 of the 
Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which has grown stronger over time. 
Although the GECF is deliberately making efforts to distance itself from the image 
of a gas cartel, there are striking parallels with the OPEC oil cartel [71, 90]. Eight 
members of OPEC (out of a total of 131) are also GECF members (out of a total of 
14). In fact, OPEC already influences gas markets in two ways. First, in some 
regions of the world, particularly in Europe, the gas price under long-term supply 
contracts is indexed to the price of oil. As OPEC (still) has some control over oil 
prices, it therefore also exercises some control over gas prices. Second, 
technologically, oil recovery is accompanied by some degree of gas recovery 
(associated gas). Hence, OPEC can directly contribute to gas supply [62]. At 
present, a large portion of associated gas is wasted (flared). The oil producing 
countries flare approximately 150 billion m3 of gas per year, which is equivalent to 
more than 5% of world gas production, 30% of EU gas demand and 75% of Russian 
gas exports [3, 120]. Capturing and selling this gas is liable to have a tremendous 
impact on the world gas market, especially in view of the very large amounts of gas 
being flared in key oil and gas producing countries [3]. Russia alone accounts for 
almost one third of all flared gas worldwide [3]. 
 
The GECF could potentially have an extremely firm grip on the market. The GECF 
controls 73% of world gas reserves and 42% of world gas production [3] – 
equivalent to OPEC’s share of world oil production [6]. The greatest risk comes 
from the GECF’s extended control – amounting to 85% - over the global flexible gas 
trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) [3]. The large overlap between GECF members 
and top flaring countries [3] indicates that there is additional potential to boost 
their combined supply power. Russia is a member of the GECF, despite the fact that 
historically it has abstained from OPEC membership. 
 
Faced with such a prospect, the industrialised countries that possess modest gas 
reserves have begun to look for alternative ways to secure their energy supply and 
economic growth. Owing to progress in technologies, it has become cost-efficient to 
exploit deeper and less abundant deposits of gas that are generally more 
                                           
1 Indonesia is still considered to be an OPEC member, although the country announced in 2008 that it 
would leave the cartel. 
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challenging to extract – so-called “unconventional gas". Of all the types of 
unconventional gas, shale gas in particular has attracted attention. The rapid 
expansion of the US shale gas sector has spurred interest for shale gas 
development in other regions possessing shale deposits, including the EU. At the 
same time, concerns regarding the broader potential economic, environmental and 
social implications (including potential impacts to human health) of developing a 
domestic shale gas industry have come to the fore. 
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2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE US SHALE GAS INDUSTRY AND 
COMPARISON WITH EU CONDITIONS 
 
The following analysis lists the main factors that have influenced the development 
of shale gas deposits in the US and the likelihood of this being replicated in the EU. 
 
Security of supply: As the largest consumer of natural gas in the world, the US is 
responsible for almost 22% of world gas demand [6]. Prior to the development of 
the US shale gas industry, domestic production of gas was declining (Figure 1), 
with imports making up the difference in the widening gap between production and 
demand. The US shale gas revolution has done much to reverse this trend - Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1: US gas supply 1990-2035 (trillion cubic feet / year) [99] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recent US reference case projections estimate a steady growth in shale gas 
production. It is forecast that shale gas will account for 47% of total US gas 
production by 2035, compared to 16% in 2009, and less than 2% in 2000 [100]. 
However, production and prices may vary significantly, depending on the pace of 
technological development, the size of technically recoverable shale gas reserves, 
economic growth and trends in world supply/demand balance - Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Left: Total US gas production under five scenarios (trillion cubic feet); 
Right: Annual average prices for gas in seven scenarios (US dollars per thousand 
cubic feet), 1990-2035 [100] 
  
 
The EU accounts for roughly 1% of global conventional gas reserves [6]. Although 
gas accounts for one quarter of gross domestic energy consumption [26], EU gas 
production is declining, even as consumption continues to rise [6]. Shale gas is 
being considered as an option to increase indigenous gas production, but it is not 
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yet developed on an industrial scale. Among the EU Member States, Poland appears 
to be most optimistic about developing domestic shale gas resources. According to 
US estimates [102], Poland holds the largest reserves of shale gas in the EU. These 
are distributed beneath a large area (Figure 3), with the majority deemed to be 
“prospective”. Roughly one hundred concessions have been granted, mainly to US 
companies including ExxonMobile, Chevron, ConocoPhilips, and Marathon Oil [45, 
150, 153]. The first shale gas exploration project in Poland commenced in 2010. 
Exploratory drilling is expected to yield better estimates of shale gas potential 
within 4-5 years, while large-scale production may be feasible within 10-15 years 
[114].  
 
Figure 3: Proven (darker fields) and potential (lighter fields) shale gas deposits in 
Poland [102] 
 
 
Besides Poland, a number of other EU Member States are deemed to have shale 
gas deposits that may be economically exploitable – Figure 4. However, the 
reserves in all these countries are noticeably smaller than in Poland. This fact 
makes the large-scale industrial production of shale gas uncertain in these 
countries by 2030 – which is the time horizon of this study. 
 
Figure 4: Shale Gas Basins of Western Europe2 [102] 
 
                                           
2 Shale gas basins in the Eastern part of the EU (except Poland) are far less promising. The only basins 
that have been assessed as having some exploitation prospects are in the Baltic States. Romania and 
Bulgaria may also have potential basins (not yet assessed). Significant availability is forecast in Ukraine 
[102]. 
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Diversity of supply: Due to the physical properties of gas, its transportation and 
handling are more restricted compared to oil. For this reason, the import options 
available to the US are very limited. Apart from pipeline imports from Canada, the 
only feasible alternative is liquefied natural gas (LNG) - Figure 5. With the GECF’s 
increasing power and its tight grip on the world LNG trade, such a growing 
dependence on a potentially cartel-like supplier could have serious economic and 
geopolitical implications. These concerns are likely to have speeded up the 
development of the US shale gas sector.  
 
Figure 5: Major gas trade movements the world in 20073 (billion m3) [5] 
 
 
The EU is heavily dependent on gas imports, which currently account for 60% of 
domestic consumption [35]. However, over the years, the EU has managed to 
diversify its gas supplies to a considerable extent, although it still imports around 
40% of all its gas from Russia – Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Breakdown of EU natural gas imports by origin in 2007 (%) [49] 
 
Currently, the EU imports its gas through pipelines from Russia, Norway, Algeria 
and Libya, whereas LNG is shipped to Europe from Norway, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, 
Egypt, Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago. The EU is considering a number of additional 
                                           
3 2007 marks the peak in US LNG imports. 
41%
27%
17%
5%
2%
3%
2% 2% 1%
Russia
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pipeline supply routes and LNG receiving terminals. Concerns about the diversity of 
supply in the EU compared to the US may, therefore, not provide a strong enough 
impetus for the development of shale gas at EU level. However, the potential 
impact of shale gas on import dependence may vary from one EU Member State to 
another. According to some analysts, under a high gas demand scenario shale gas 
could reduce France’s dependence on gas imports by 40% by 2050, while Poland 
could become self-sufficient in gas [17]. 
 
One indication of the changing structure of EU gas imports was the first ever 
importation – albeit small – of LNG from the US in 2010. US exports have been 
made possible owing to the expansion of shale gas and the resulting oversupply in 
the US market in particular. With the projected growth in US indigenous gas output, 
there will be a steady drop in US gas import needs (Figure 1) and the US may 
become a (major) LNG exporter [48]. Increasing numbers of LNG supply facilities, 
originally built to cater for the US market, will most likely be available in the future 
to other gas users around the world. The drastically reduced import needs in the US 
have already led to the shift of considerable volumes of LNG, originally destined for 
the US, to the European market [43, 74, 87]. The increase in LNG supply has also 
affected alternative pipeline supplies and contracts, making them more flexible [68, 
75, 101, 121], to the benefit of gas buyers. For example, Russia has had to lower 
gas prices for the European market and to allow a fraction of its sales to be indexed 
to spot gas market or regional market hubs, rather than to oil prices [79, 101]. 
Depending on the availability of LNG, the tendency to actually make gas contracts 
fairer may become more pronounced in the future. The EU is often quoted as being 
one of the main winners in such a scenario [43, 68, 74, 78, 79, 87]. To sum up, the 
EU is already benefiting significantly, although indirectly, from the US shale gas 
boom. 
 
Gas prices: Natural gas production from shale deposits is typically more costly than 
conventional gas production. The accelerated development of shale gas in the US 
coincided with - and was indeed triggered by - a period of rising (and generally 
high) gas prices worldwide [74]. Between 1998 and 2005, US gas prices 
quadrupled – see Figure 7. Besides making gas projects more attractive, high gas 
prices partially compensated for the initial capital-intensive mistakes made due to 
lack of experience (learning-by-doing) in the early stages of development of the US 
shale gas industry [74]. 
 
Figure 7: Average annual gas prices in different markets (US dollars per million 
Btu, MBtu) between 1993 and 2010 [6] 
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In theory, the price of energy goes down in times of financial and economic crisis. 
However, this phenomenon was not so pronounced or has even been absent in the 
past few years, mainly for geopolitical reasons. World energy markets are likely to 
become increasingly unpredictable [52, 90]. In a situation of financial and economic 
uncertainty, it would be challenging to commit substantial and sustained 
investment to less proven undertakings such as shale gas [74]. Conventional 
natural gas production is generally a more mature technology than shale gas 
production. The major gas suppliers – the GECF and Russia – may be in a position 
to supply gas to Europe, at least until 2030, at such (low) price levels so as to hold 
back the development of indigenous EU reserves of shale gas [18, 75]. 
 
Geological knowledge of shale deposits: The US Geological Survey (USGS, 
www.usgs.gov), a specialised scientific agency of the US Department of the 
Interior, is a reference centre for high-quality geological data, information and 
analysis for the US and the rest of the world. Within the USGS, the Energy 
Resources Program undertakes “to understand the processes critical to the 
formation, accumulation, occurrence and alteration of geologically based energy 
resources; to conduct scientifically robust assessments of those resources; and to 
study the impact of energy resource occurrence and/or production and use on both 
environmental and human health” [109]. The contribution of the USGS to the 
thorough understanding of shale gas geology in the US has been critical to the 
success of the shale gas industry [126]. In particular, it has been crucial for 
reducing extraction costs by facilitating targeted exploration activities. 
 
Shale gas deposits in the EU are spread across large areas, often beneath several 
Member States. The extent of geological knowledge at EU level is less advanced 
than in the US [41, 44, 59, 74, 75]. There is no comparable, consistent and 
comprehensive EU geological repository, although Member States do have their 
own geological services. In addition, EU geology in general seems to be more 
complex [40, 59, 74, 76, 90, 117] – shale gas deposits tend to be smaller and 
deeper [18]. The situation may differ considerably across the EU – in some areas, 
shale gas might be more easily extracted than in other areas. The main research 
priorities in this regard are to derive detailed information on the geological 
characteristics of EU shale gas deposits and how they influence the economic 
feasibility of recovery. 
 
Experience with shale gas exploration and exploitation: Although the US shale gas 
revolution only spans the past decade, the very first attempts to develop shale gas 
deposits in the US date back to the nineteenth century – Figure 8. Industrial-scale 
exploitation of shale gas formations began almost 40 years ago, triggered by the 
First Oil Shock (1973). Technologies were being continuously developed and 
refined. This sustained and consistent process led to a step change in the techno-
economics of shale gas recovery in the 2000’s - Figure 1. Underpinned by the high 
world gas prices (Figure 7), this technological breakthrough resulted in a massive 
increase in gas supply from shale deposits – Figure 1 [59, 76, 87, 98, 103]. 
 
By contrast, shale gas exploration and exploitation are in the very early stages of 
development in the EU. Both experience and infrastructure are scarce. 
Experimental drillings have been conducted in several Member States, including the 
UK, Poland, Germany and France. A major hurdle to EU shale gas exploration is the 
insufficient availability of equipment (drilling rigs, in particular) and trained staff, 
which is mainly due to the far smaller number of mid-stream services and service 
companies than in the US. In theory, this shortage could be overcome, but in any 
event the catching-up process would be costly and time consuming. From the 
energy industry perspective, the scarcity of equipment and personnel is quoted as a 
major, if not the most important, bottleneck for shale gas development in the EU in 
the foreseeable future [18, 19, 21, 41, 51, 59, 74, 86, 90, 95, 121]. 
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Figure 8: Shale gas development in the US (lower 48 states) [21] 
 
 
Population density: Shale gas deposits are typically less concentrated and are 
distributed across larger areas than is the case with conventional gas deposits. 
Shale gas exploitation therefore requires higher density drilling over 
correspondingly greater surface areas [21] compared to conventional gas 
extraction. For example, almost 4 000 vertical and 7 000 horizontal wells were 
drilled in the Barnett shale gas field between 1990 and 2008 [82]. Shale gas wells 
also tend to become exhausted more quickly than conventional gas wells [21]. The 
productivity of horizontal wells declines particularly rapidly, i.e. by almost 50% 
from the first to the third year of operation [66]. The technological requirement for 
more intensive drilling to extract shale gas compared to conventional gas involves 
the increased likelihood of conflicts with alternative land uses.  
 
As Figure 9 shows, the US has a relatively low average population density – 
namely 32 inhabitants per km2 [26]. To date, most US shale gas production has 
occurred in the Barnett shale gas field in Texas, where population density is only 
slightly higher than the US average – at 38 inhabitants per km2. Competition for 
surface access or social opposition in this particular region has not significantly 
affected the development of the industry. As production continues to expand into 
far more densely populated areas, such as the Marcellus Shale gas field in the 
North-East US, it remains to be seen what socio-economic impacts such 
competition may have and how these can be resolved. 
 
Europe is far more densely populated than the US, with 113 inhabitants per km2 
[26], although population densities vary both between and within Member States. 
Given the intensive drilling over a large surface area and the substantial support 
infrastructure required for exploiting shale gas, high population densities may 
present a major barrier to the large-scale development of shale gas extraction in 
many parts of the EU [40, 41, 75, 111, 117, 121] due to the increased likelihood of 
conflict with other land users. For example, the US Barnett shale gas field in 
northern Texas consists of roughly 8 000 wells spread over a total area that is 
comparable to the combined area of Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) [114]. It should therefore be a priority research objective to map 
shale gas reserves versus population densities and alternative uses of land in order 
to identify areas of potential conflict. 
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Figure 9: World population density map (inhabitants per km2) 
 
Source: http://urbancongress.wordpress.com/ 
 
Legal status of underground resources: Under US legislation, the property rights to 
underground resources, including shale gas deposits, belong to landowners. US 
landowners therefore have an economic interest in the development of shale gas 
resources underlying their property via lease payments. In the case of the Barnett 
field, shale gas often represents a key opportunity, if not the only economic 
opportunity, for landowners to earn a reasonable return on property [59, 89, 113]. 
 
The property rights to underground resources in the EU are state-owned and 
regulated at Member State level. Shale gas exploration and exploitation may 
therefore go against landowners’ interests and hence may encounter strong 
opposition. It is difficult to predict the extent to which the interests of property 
owners may present an obstacle to potential shale gas projects. Major issues arise 
as to the kind of compensation schemes that might be envisaged to facilitate 
acceptance of shale gas development by the public, and at what cost in terms of 
money and time [41, 51, 59, 90, 117, 121]. 
 
Energy sector structure: Historically, in the US, major energy companies have 
concentrated their efforts on exploiting conventional gas reserves, whereas the 
development of unconventional deposits was largely beyond their core sphere of 
interest [21]. A number of smaller, more flexible and innovative independent 
energy companies filled this gap. Their continuous and consistent research and 
development of extraction techniques, assisted by rising gas prices (Figure 7) has 
done much to facilitate the advent of the large-scale commercial exploitation of 
shale gas resources in the US [59, 79, 90]. 
 
Unlike the US energy sector, where there are many large and small players, the EU 
energy sector is dominated by a few large companies. Their investment portfolios 
sometimes include shale gas, but only as a minor component in their overall 
diversification strategies. There are practically no smaller venture companies in the 
EU that appear keen to pursue sustained and consistent investment in shale gas 
technologies and deposits. On the other hand, the potential involvement of big EU 
energy companies in future shale gas exploration and exploitation could speed up 
progress, due to their large capital availability and greater capacity to hedge 
market risks in the more regulated EU markets, as the next paragraph explains 
[18, 21, 87, 95]. 
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Ownership/operation of pipelines and access to pipeline capacity: Every gas 
producer in the US, regardless of size, can place competitive bids for pipeline 
throughput capacity in a free market situation. The transport capacity is not 
exclusively reserved for the pipeline owner or for a few short-listed large producers. 
Such a market structure ensures that smaller, independent shale gas developers 
have a secured access to the gas market, thereby guaranteeing a channel to 
reimburse their upstream investment. Without such a liberalised market structure, 
the US shale gas boom would have been significantly impeded [59, 79, 90]. 
 
The EU gas market is currently far less liberal than that of the US. There are still a 
number of limitations as far as access to transport capacity is concerned. Although 
the physical infrastructure may be in place, it is not accessible to all operators [21, 
59]. The EU’s Third Gas Package [31, 33, 34] aims to eliminate the remaining 
restrictions in order to create a truly liberalised single market for gas. However, not 
enough progress has yet been achieved at Member State level. Eighteen of the 
twenty-seven EU Member States face court proceedings for non-compliance with EU 
internal energy market regulations [25]. Such market imperfections may 
discourage investments in the development of shale gas by stakeholders - 
regardless of their size - who do not possess pre-booked or guaranteed transport 
capacity [90, 95, 121].  
 
Regulatory framework for the exploration and exploitation of shale gas: The US 
shale gas industry is exempt from many federal regulations, leaving most of the 
oversight to state governments [24, 61, 92, 103], which have at times been hard 
pressed to keep up with the rapid growth of the industry. US state authorities have 
generally been favourably disposed towards shale gas development as a means of 
promoting economic development [37, 92, 113]. Support also included favourable 
tax incentives for the upstream sector4 [59]. This preferential tax treatment has 
encouraged smaller and innovative independent companies to pursue shale gas 
exploration and development [79, 90]. 
 
The current legislative framework in the EU was largely drafted for the exploration 
and exploitation of conventional gas deposits. As observed by Geny [59], its 
components, such as definitions, concepts and permit procedures, may sometimes 
not correspond to the specifics of unconventional gas, including shale gas.  For 
example, the exploration and exploitation of a single shale gas field in Europe may 
involve obtaining several permits through several different regulatory procedures if 
the field is located beneath several (neighbouring) countries. These countries may 
have quite different regulatory regimes, which can complicate and delay exploration 
and exploitation. Furthermore, the exploration licences are typically granted for 
strictly pre-defined blocks. Such a procedure may impede the quick and efficient 
continuous search for layers that are rich in shale-gas, and make it even harder for 
developers to obtain licences for blocks [59]. 
 
Concerns about the security and diversity of energy supply, on the other hand, are 
putting growing pressure on the EU. In view of these concerns, the European 
Commission has stated in its vision for 2020 that “the potential for further 
development of EU indigenous fossil fuel resources, including unconventional5 gas, 
exists and the role they will play must be assessed in all objectivity” [124]. In 
keeping with the subsidiarity principle, the Commission has not earmarked any 
specific form of unconventional gas, because the choice of fuel mix remains the 
                                           
4 The Intangible Drilling Cost (IDC) Expense Rule has had a particularly strong positive impact on shale 
gas pioneers. IDCs which are incurred during drilling and initiating production (such as wages, supplies, 
contractor services, etc.) and for which there is no salvage value, account for 70% of total well 
development costs. According to the IDC Expense Rule, if IDC are expensed, they are deducted against 
tax liability in the year in which they are incurred instead of being distributed across future years. In this 
way, smaller companies secure enough cash to re-invest into shale gas development [79]. 
5 Authors’ underlining 
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sovereign domain of the EU Member States. The European Council has further 
developed the Commission’s proposal and called for an assessment of Europe's 
potential for sustainable extraction and use of conventional and unconventional 
(shale gas and oil shale) fossil fuel resources [27]. The Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy Council later re-affirmed the European Council’s 
position, but added that “in order to further enhance its security of supply, the EU's 
potential for sustainable extraction and use of conventional and unconventional 
(e.g. shale gas, oil shale) fossil fuel resources should be assessed, in accordance 
with existing legislation on environment protection” [14]. In this context, various 
European Commission services, such as the DG Energy (ENER), DG Environment 
(ENV), DG Climate Action (CLIMA) and DG Joint Research Centre (JRC), are 
currently conducting comprehensive analyses to ascertain the extent to which 
current legislation in the EU is conducive to the development of shale gas 
resources, and what modifications might be necessary in order to ensure that any 
such development is sustainable. Nevertheless, to date there is no dedicated 
legislative framework for shale gas development at EU level. Concurrently, the EU 
has put forward ambitious alternative energy goals for renewable energy sources 
[30] and energy efficiency.  
 
The above analysis suggests that the role of indigenous shale gas in the future 
energy mix of the EU may not be so decisive for European and world gas markets 
compared to the role of US shale gas. Such a hypothesis is underpinned by various 
independent estimates (Figure 10 and Figure 11), which come to rather similar 
conclusions that shale gas deposits in the EU are much smaller than US deposits. 
The EU’s share of the assumed global shale gas reserves ranges between 4% 
[Figure 10] and 11% [102], which is larger than the corresponding EU share of 
1% of world conventional gas reserves. However, it does not appear large enough 
to evolve into a gas game-changer for the EU as it did for the US [86, 117], unless 
very high gas prices (above 8.0-9.0 USD/MBtu [19, 75, 121]) continue for a long 
period of time [18]. Moderating the impact of indigenous shale gas exploitation for 
the EU as a whole would be a minor consideration [29, 17]. However, the potential 
contributions of shale gas may differ considerably from one Member State to 
another [161]. Some recent scenarios predict that shale gas might contribute 5% 
of EU production and 2-3% of EU consumption in the coming decades [29]. Other 
countries in the world, such as Canada and China [41, 49, 68, 82, 87, 90], may be 
better positioned than the EU for shale gas exploitation.  
 
Figure 10: Regional distribution of tight sand and shale gas resources [3] 
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Figure 11: Projected total global natural gas production, including shale gas 
production, in 2030, in billion m3 [82] 
 
 
 
Summary: The impetus for and rapid development of the US shale gas industry is 
attributable to a suite of factors, including: 1) Good geological knowledge that 
helped reduce costs; 2) Long experience with shale gas exploration and 
exploitation, which led to a step change in extraction technologies and economics; 
3) Relatively low population densities that enabled intensive drilling across large 
areas; 4) Private property status of underground resources, which motivated 
landowners to support shale gas; 5) Diversified and highly competitive energy 
sector which accommodates a number of smaller and independent venture 
companies that continuously refined shale gas technology, along with a large 
number of service companies; 6) Various regulatory and tax preferences, which 
helped to rapidly kick-start the shale gas industry; 7) A liberalised gas market, 
where every shale gas developer had access to pipeline capacity to sell its gas. The 
growth of the US shale gas industry has also been facilitated by the growing 
security and diversity of supply concerns and rising gas prices. 
 
Many of the factors for success in the US are likely to be experienced as drawbacks 
in Europe. The key disadvantages in Europe appear to be the high population 
densities, the lack of innovative smaller players in the EU energy sector and the 
shortage of drilling equipment and trained staff. The geological knowledge at EU 
level is fragmented and the geology itself seems to be more challenging than in the 
US. There is very little experience of shale gas exploitation. Underground resources 
are the exclusive property of national governments, with the result that private 
initiatives are discouraged. The EU gas market and pipeline infrastructure is still 
largely monopolised by big companies that dominate the EU energy sector. EU gas 
imports are becoming increasingly diversified against a backdrop of lower gas 
prices. The shale gas potential in the EU is generally estimated to be modest. EU 
shale gas will also be more expensive than US shale gas.  
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3. ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF SHALE GAS 
EXPLOITATION  
 
Until recently, the environmental implications of shale gas exploration and 
exploitation received little consideration. With the accelerated development of shale 
gas production, these externalities are starting to attract greater attention. 
Concerns about the safety and environmental compliance of shale gas production 
were, in part, triggered by the 2010 British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon oil 
platform incident in the Gulf of Mexico [74, 89]. The US Department of Energy has 
ordered a comprehensive assessment of challenges, including the environmental 
challenges, of extended shale gas development [88, 104]. The US Environmental 
Protection Agency is also investigating the issue. All of these initiatives are driven 
by the growing realisation that shale gas development may be hampered by 
environmental concerns in the future [44, 45, 47, 54, 59, 75, 76, 89, 90, 92].  
 
The assessment of environmental risks is even more relevant to the EU, where 
sensitivity about the environment is generally greater than in the US [86, 87]. 
Several studies have been carried out or are underway on this matter. A recent 
report by the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies [59] provides a general overview 
of the EU regulatory framework and contains a regulatory analysis for several EU 
Member States (the Netherlands, Germany, Poland). A study, produced at the 
request of the European Parliament [29], provides a brief overview of potential 
environmental issues related to shale gas development within the current EU 
regulatory framework. Amongst its conclusions, the study identifies serious gaps in 
the existing EU legislative frameworks that could potentially apply to shale gas 
development. In particular, the study has noted that the threshold for the 
Environmental Impact Assessment of gas projects is currently set at 500 000 m3 of 
gas extraction per day, which is well above any feasible industrial yield of shale gas 
in Europe. The European Environment Agency has also discussed the potential 
environmental implications of shale gas, in particular as far as contamination of 
ground and surface water is concerned [28]. Other relevant studies include reports 
from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and the European Centre for 
Energy and Resource Security [96, 75]. Various European Commission services, in 
particular DG Environment (ENV) and DG Climate Action (CLIMA), are also carrying 
out detailed studies on the environmental and regulatory implications of potential 
large-scale shale gas extraction in the EU. The following analysis aims to 
summarise the likely environmental concerns of shale gas exploitation in the EU 
from a broader sustainability perspective. 
 
Freshwater consumption: Consumption of freshwater for high-volume hydraulic 
fracturing is often cited as a primary drawback of current shale gas extraction 
technologies [21, 68, 77, 86, 87, 92, 98, 121]. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), mandated by Congress, has launched a comprehensive study of the 
freshwater footprint of shale gas production [108]. The final results of this study 
are expected by 2014 [81]. 
 
The North American experience suggests that there may be wide variations in the 
use of freshwater – ranging from 1 500 to 45 000 cubic metres per well [29]. These 
variations depend on the particular geology and structure of the field in question 
[112]. Wells may also require re-fracturing during their lifetime in order to improve 
production rates [29, 96]. Some wells may be re-fractured up to ten times [29]. 
 
Current estimates of the scale of water use for shale gas exploitation are 
contradictory. For example, according to one source, water use for shale gas 
exploitation in the Barnett shale gas field accounts for roughly 25% of the total 
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water demand for Texas county6 [29], while another source suggests that water 
usage accounts for only 0.1-0.8% of total water use across US shale gas regions - 
Figure 12 [16, 103].  
 
Figure 12: Comparative water usage in major shale plays [77] 
Shale gas plays Public 
supply 
Industrial / 
Mining 
Irrigation Livestock Shale gas 
Barnett, TX 82.7%   3.7%   6.3%   2.3%   0.4% 
Fayetteville, AR   2.3% 33.3% 62.9%   0.3%   0.1% 
Haynesville, LA/TX 45.9% 13.5%   8.5%   4.0%   0.8% 
Marcellus, NY/PA/WV 12.0% 71.7%   0.1% <0.1% <0.1% 
 
Currently, there are no reliable comparisons of the water footprint of shale gas 
versus other energy sources. Some estimates of average life cycle water use 
(m3/GJ) for conventional energy sources calculate the following figures: 0.164 for 
coal, 0.086 for uranium, 1.058 for crude oil, and 1.090 for natural gas [60]. While 
the water footprint of shale gas will clearly be higher than that of conventional 
natural gas, it will be necessary to conduct similar thorough and comprehensive 
research on water consumption in order to ascertain its performance relative to coal 
and oil, for example. In particular, such research should consider the relative 
importance of removals of water from the hydrological cycle due to the deep-well 
injection of wastewater against comparable removals for other energy technologies.  
 
The overall pressure of shale gas extraction on freshwater availability at the level of 
EU Member States is difficult to predict. So far, there is no industrial-scale 
production of shale gas in the EU. As already stated, the shale gas geology in 
Europe appears to be far more complex than in North America, and may require 
denser, deeper and more sophisticated drilling. Simple logic suggests that the 
water consumption in the EU may be greater than in the US. In any event, the 
availability of freshwater in the EU is generally lower than in North America (Figure 
13). 
 
Figure 13: Freshwater resources per capita in the world 
 
Source: http://www.printablemapstore.com/ 
 
                                           
6 17 billion litres for shale gas out of a total of 67 billion litres of total water use [29] 
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Only nine EU Member States possess larger freshwater resources per capita than 
the US, which has 9 344 m3 per capita per year [119] – Figure 14. The 
environmental (and social) implications of water use for shale gas exploitation 
needs to be assessed carefully, on a case-by-case basis. While the overall water 
footprint of shale gas production might be negligible in terms of national per capita 
water resources, on a local scale the production of shale gas could have a 
substantial impact on freshwater supply. If exploitation occurs in areas where local 
populations are already experiencing water deficits, the incremental pressure on 
available water resources could be severe [59, 77, 96, 98, 103]. Seasonal 
variations in water supply should also be taken into account [16]. 
 
Figure 14: Freshwater resources per capita in EU Member States based on a 20-
year average (1 000 cubic metres) [62] 
 
Note: Luxembourg – estimate; Malta - not available 
 
Freshwater pollution: Another environmental concern associated with current shale 
gas technologies that is being widely discussed is the potential pollution of 
freshwater resources [21, 50, 51, 68, 87, 88, 92, 96, 98]. The majority of all the 
incidents reported as a result of drilling shale gas wells in the US from 2005-2009 
are related to contamination of ground and surface waters (Figure 15). The extent 
to which the risks of such pollution are manageable is a matter of ongoing debate. 
Potential risk mitigation measures include excellent geological knowledge, strict 
compliance with safety and security prescriptions, and the application of state-of-
the-art technologies (seismic, drilling, fracturing, gas capturing, etc.) that are 
properly run by well-trained and experienced technical and managerial staff [22, 
77, 87, 103, 121]. 
 
Figure 15: Widely reported incidents involving shale gas well drilling in the US, 
2005-2009 [77] 
Type of Incident Number % of total 
Groundwater contamination by natural gas or drilling fluid 20 47 
On-site surface spills 14 33 
Off-site disposal issues 4 9 
Water withdrawal issues 2 5 
Blowouts 2 5 
Air quality 1 2 
 
An excellent knowledge of geology is the major prerequisite in order to avoid 
groundwater contamination when exploring and exploiting shale gas fields. This is 
mainly required to map the location of shale gas layers in relation to underground 
aquifers. In by far the majority of cases to date, the shale gas layer was located 
beneath underground aquifers [9, 20, 77] – Figure 16 (left). However, it is 
possible to have shale gas layers that are above (Figure 16, right), or even at the 
same level (including bordering) as underground aquifers.  
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Figure 16: Shale gas formations located beneath (left) and above (right) 
underground aquifers 
 
 
Sources: http://coto2.wordpress.com/ http://crudeoiltrader.blogspot.com/ 
 
The hazards with respect to groundwater contamination in these three cases are 
different. In the first case, the risk arises from failure of drilling or fracturing 
equipment and facilities, e.g. damaged insulation at the aquifer level or fracturing 
water spillage on the surface. The insulation could fail not only due to improper 
construction or installation, but also as a result of seismic activity [9]. In the 
second case, the hazard arises from highly permeable rocks between the upper 
shale gas layer and the lower underground aquifer. Here it is important that the 
geological analysis should reveal the type, composition and characteristics of the 
(various) rocks above, and sometimes below, the shale layer. The third possible 
case – where the shale gas layer borders underground aquifers – combines the 
risks of the first two cases and adds another – namely the direct underground 
mixing between fracturing fluid and freshwater. Due to this combination of risks, 
the third case, if found, would most likely be inappropriate for the environmentally 
acceptable exploration and exploitation of shale gas deposits. 
 
The two most common types of freshwater pollution associated with shale gas 
extraction are methane contamination and particulate contamination. Pollution may 
also occur as a result of the introduction of fracturing chemicals – Figure 15. 
 
Methane contamination of freshwater is often reported in association with coal and 
natural gas extraction [29, 59, 61, 77, 83, 87, 94]. Isotope evidence allows us to 
distinguish between biogenic methane7 and thermogenic methane8 (from shale). A 
recent US study [114] analysed methane9 contamination in groundwater from 60 
groundwater wells (from 36 to 190 metres in depth) in northeast Pennsylvania and 
upstate New York. Wells were selected from “active” areas of shale gas exploitation 
(at least one water well within 1 km of a gas well) and “non-active” areas (no gas 
well within 1 km of a water well), many of which had been earmarked for shale gas 
drilling. Methane was detected in 51 of these 60 water wells (85%), irrespective of 
gas industry operations. Thermogenic methane concentrations were substantially 
higher (on average, by 17 times) in wells in active areas as compared to those in 
non-active areas. Methane in tap water presents a potential fire and explosion 
hazard. Use of best-available technologies and practices can minimise methane 
leakage into groundwater [77, 87]. 
                                           
7 Biogenic methane is produced by subsurface bacteria and is a common natural source of methane gas 
in groundwater aquifers used for water well supplies. 
8 Thermogenic methane gas is produced at greater depths through high pressure and temperature 
processes and is characteristic of deep oil & gas reservoirs that conventional energy wells tap into. 
9 Consisting of dissolved-gas concentrations of methane, higher-chain hydrocarbons and hydrogen 
isotope ratios of methane. 
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The good news is that gas producers are indeed interested in minimising methane 
leaks into water, as such leaks represent a direct loss of income for them. Novel 
technologies are deemed capable of capturing up to 90% of the methane that is 
dissolved in water [77, 87]. However, these extra methane-capturing facilities 
involve an extra cost for shale gas producers. So far, the methane contamination of 
freshwater / tap water has been largely ignored in the US [59], but it may be 
regulated in the future10. 
 
Particulate contamination of ground and surface water may result from seismic, 
drilling or fracturing activities. Fine particles may be removed from impacted water 
by means of treatment, but this will involve an additional cost to water treatment 
facilities and their operators. The severity of particulate contamination will be 
context specific, as it is influenced by a combination of geological, groundwater 
resource and extraction practice variables. This issue would probably also vary in 
severity according to both water scarcity and population density. Particulate 
pollution of freshwater resources is prohibited under existing European legislation 
[12]. 
 
Chemical additives account for 0.5-2% of fracturing fluid [29, 77, 96]. These 
chemicals serve a variety of purposes (Figure 17). Despite their low relative 
inclusion rate, some chemical additives may present health and environmental 
risks, even when present in small concentrations. Given the large volumes of 
fracturing fluids used, the absolute volume of chemicals deployed will be high, 
despite the low inclusion rate. For example, fracturing a single well using 15 000 
cubic metres of water involves the use of 75 to 300 cubic metres of chemical 
additives. Some of these chemicals will return to the surface in flow-back water at 
the end of the fracturing process, while the balance will remain underground [68, 
84, 87, 96, 110]. 
 
Figure 17: Typical fracturing fluid additives [77] 
Purpose Chemical Common use 
Clean up damage from initial 
drilling, initiate cracks in rock 
 
HCI Swimming pool cleaner 
Gel agents to adjust viscosity Guar gum Thickener in cosmetics, 
toothpaste, sauces 
Viscosity breakers Ammonium persulfate, 
potassium, sodium 
peroxydisulfate 
Bleach agent in detergent 
and hair cosmetics 
Biocides Gluteraldehyde, 2,2-
dibromo3-
nitrilophopionamide 
Medical disinfectant 
Surfactant 
 
Isopropanol Glass cleaner, antiperspirant 
Corrosion inhibitor 
 
N, n-dimethylformamide Pharmaceuticals 
Clay stabiliser Potassium chloride Low sodium table salt 
substitute 
 
According to a US survey [110], shale gas developers use 652 chemical products in 
hydraulic fracturing, 29 of which are regarded as toxic substances. Many fracturing 
fluid additives are relatively commonplace substances that have a number of 
alternative applications. Other chemicals are hazardous, even in small 
concentrations [84, 96, 110]. 
                                           
10 If recommended by the conclusions of the ongoing EPA study on the potential impacts of hydraulic 
fracturing on drinking water resources [108], due by 2014. 
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Figure 18 provides a list of the top ten substances of concern that are currently 
used in hydraulic fracturing in the US, along with their absolute and relative 
frequency. Methanol is the compound that appears to be the most widely used, 
followed by ethylene glycol. Methanol is a highly toxic compound that is fully 
soluble in water. Very small concentrations in drinking water may cause blindness 
and even death. Methanol can be ingested orally and via the skin, and it burns with 
an almost invisible flame, which makes it difficult to detect. It is also a strongly 
corrosive agent and may increase the risk of accidental breakdown of steel-made 
fracturing fluid infrastructure [8, 106]. 
  
Figure 18: Top ten most frequently used chemical components of concern in 
hydraulic fracturing in the US. Source: Carcinogens, Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA) regulated chemicals and Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP) risks [110] 
Chemical Component Chemical Category No of products % in total 
1. Methanol (Methyl alcohol) HAP 342 52 
2. Ethylene glycol (1,2-
ethanediol) 
HAP 119 18 
3. Diesel
11
 Carcinogen, SDWA, HAP 51 8 
4. Naphthalene Carcinogen, HAP 44 7 
5. Xylene SDWA, HAP 44 7 
6. Hydrogen chloride 
(Hydrochloric acid) 
HAP 42 6 
7. Toluene SDWA, HAP 29 4 
8. Ethylbenzene SDWA, HAP 28 4 
9. Diethanolamine (2,2-
iminodiethanol) 
HAP 14 2 
10. Formaldehyde Carcinogen, HAP 12 2 
 
A review of the chemical additives used in New York State for hydraulic fracturing 
identified 22% as having one or more of the following properties of concern: toxic 
to the aquatic environment or human health; carcinogenic or suspected to be 
carcinogenic or; mutagenic or having reproductive effects. The list of substances 
includes: Isopropyl alcohol, Acrylamide, Benzene, Ethyl Benzene, Iso-
propylbenzene (cumene), Naphthalene, Tetrasodium, Ethylenediaminetetra-
acetate, 2-butoxy ethanol (ethylene glycol monobutyl ether), ethylene oxide, oil-
based solvents containing aromatic substances, and hydroxylamine hydrochloride 
[29, 96]. Many of these compounds may be regulated under EU legislation on water 
protection, REACH and biocides because of their high potential for affecting human 
health and the environment [29, 96]. 
 
The preservation of the environment, including taking precautionary measures, 
may be hampered by the lack of information as to the exact compounds and 
substances that are being used as fracturing fluid additives. Shale gas developers 
and chemical companies typically do not disclose the full list of shale gas fracturing 
compounds, as this is considered to be an issue of corporate confidentiality [77, 84, 
87, 92, 96, 110]. Fracturing additives are specifically chosen and tuned to certain 
geology (rock composition), with the result that a shale gas company may use a 
long list of substances even for the development of a single field. In view of the 
differences between North American and European geologies, the experience with 
fracturing additives in the US may be of little relevance to the EU context [ 96]. 
 
Wastewater treatment and disposal: Current hydraulic fracturing technologies for 
shale gas extraction generate large volumes of wastewater that is potentially 
harmful to the environment [68, 77, 87, 90, 92, 96, 98, 110, 112]. It usually 
                                           
11 Diesel contains benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylenes. 
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contains chemical additives used in fracturing and dissolved substances from 
subsurface materials. Depending on the particular geology of the shale deposit, 
wastewater may also contain heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactive 
materials (NORMS) that are leached from shale beds [29, 84, 87, 90, 92, 96, 103]. 
In the latter cases, special water handling and treatment considerations will apply.  
 
Managing bulky amounts of wastewater from shale gas extraction in a greenfield 
site, often remote from any existing water treatment facilities, could require 
substantial incremental investment, even if the shale gas is produced near to 
existing industrial or municipal sewage facilities. Existing facilities are typically 
rated at a given flow with a certain reserve that would probably not be sufficient to 
absorb the huge wastewater streams from shale gas production. Building extra 
sewage facilities (pipes, stations) to meet the shale gas input could be very 
expensive and challenging in an area that has already been populated by other 
industrial users. 
 
So far, the wastewater issue has attracted relatively little attention in the US, 
because the relevant legislation has been fairly liberal [24, 77, 110]. Underground 
storage, and deep well injection of wastewater in particular, is (still) allowed [21, 
77, 92, 112]. The collection of wastewater for subsequent treatment is a more 
sustainable, but also a more expensive option – Figure 19. In the EU, there are 
very strict rules for wastewater management, which include treatment, discharge, 
control and sanctions. Handling large volumes of fracturing water from shale gas 
development in compliance with EU regulations may impose significant extra costs 
on shale gas developers. Shale gas exploitation may not be feasible in areas where 
no sustainable and legally compliant solution for wastewater can be found. 
 
Figure 19: A shale gas flow-back lagoon, Greene County, PA 
 
Source: http://skunkinthewoodpile.com/ 
 
There is also a risk of the accidental spillage of water from fracturing operations 
[92, 96]. The probability of such an accident per shale gas well is in principle 
comparable to that for similar conventional gas wells. However, the cumulative risk 
of accidental spillage due to technology failure or malfunctioning is greater for shale 
gas due to the larger number of wells that have to be drilled compared to those for 
conventional gas. Spills can also be caused by natural phenomena, e.g. pit overflow 
due to heavy rainfall. The larger overall volume of wastewater needing treatment 
also carries a greater risk of breakdown [47, 59, 68]. 
 
Alternatives to hydraulic fracturing: In view of the important environmental hazards 
of hydraulic fracturing, various alternatives are currently being investigated. These 
include substituting diesel with mineral or plant oil, reusing wastewater (flow-back 
water), using treated acid mine drainage (AMD) water, and replacing water with 
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liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or liquefied carbon dioxide (CO2) as a fracturing 
component [70]. Although these technological alternatives seem to solve some of 
the problems of hydraulic fracturing, they may present other techno-economic and 
environmental trade-offs, including: 
 Recirculation of water reduces total freshwater demand, but it risks blocking the 
fractures in gas-containing layers with large amounts of substances (e.g. 
barium, calcium, iron, magnesium, manganese) that were washed out during 
previous circulations [70]. The flow-back water either needs to be cleaned 
before re-injection, or should be mixed with freshwater in order to reduce the 
concentration of contaminants. 
 The use of treated acid mine drainage (AMD) water from idle coal mines may 
also reduce the demand for freshwater [70]. The necessary pre-condition is that 
sufficient volumes of AMD water should be available within a reasonable 
distance of the shale gas site. Otherwise, the high transportation costs of 
bringing AMD water to the shale gas site could rule the scheme out. 
 The main advantage of using LPG instead of water for fracturing is that no 
waste stream (wastewater) is generated, as the LPG used is recaptured [70]. , 
However, LPG is highly flammable and involves significant fire and explosion 
hazards. Small fires can be extinguished with dry powder, but large fires should 
only be tackled by properly trained fire-fighters. LPG is heavier than air and, in 
the event of a leak, vapour may accumulate in confined spaces and low-lying 
areas, presenting health and safety hazards. High concentrations have 
anaesthetic properties. Exposure to very high concentrations may result in loss 
of consciousness, convulsions and even asphyxiation. As LPG tends to build up a 
static charge when transferred by pipelines, it is essential that vessels used for 
receiving and transfer, including the pipelines, should be earthed [7, 107]. 
 The main advantage of using liquid CO2 instead of water for fracturing is the 
much higher yield (up to five times higher) of natural gas [70]. Nevertheless, it 
may be difficult to justify the free flow of liquefied CO2 (sometimes mixed with 
Nitrogen (N2) in order to avoid ice formation in wells) in a carbon-constrained 
environment (such as the EU), due to the risk of leakage. The issues with 
CO2/N2 quality (purity) and its impact on transport and storage infrastructure 
and equipment, as well as with the sufficient availability of CO2/N2 
transportation infrastructure, further undermine the feasibility of this option 
[125]. CO2/N2 tests to date have been carried out mostly in Canada. 
 
All except the first of these novel technological alternatives to traditional hydraulic 
fracturing are still in the early stages of research and development. Even if some of 
them prove to be successful, their implementation at scale is unlikely before 2030 – 
which is the time horizon of this study – especially in the EU. 
 
Biodiversity and natural conservation: Shale gas development entails intensive 
surface activity, largely concentrated on well-pads and supported by networks of 
roads, utility lines and pipelines. Particularly during the well drilling and fracturing 
phase, truck traffic to service well sites is heavy, and noise nuisance can be 
considerable. The development of shale gas resources in the EU may therefore be 
constrained in areas where biodiversity and natural conservation priorities are high.  
 
The Natura 2000 ecological network of protected areas, which builds upon the Birds 
Directive (1979, codified 2009 [32]) and Habitats Directive (1992 [11]), is the 
cornerstone of the EU’s nature and biodiversity policy. It includes more than 26 000 
sites and covers almost 18% of the EU land area. It is noteworthy that a significant 
share of shale deposits coincides with protected areas in the EU – Figure 20, 
compared to Figure 4 [59]. 
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Figure 20: Natura 2000 map of Europe12 
 
Source: Adapted from the European Environment Agency – Data and Maps portal 
 
Local air quality: Emissions from shale gas exploitation may include NOx, volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), particulate matter, SO2, and methane [88, 103]. 
Emissions arise as fugitive releases of fracturing chemicals and as combustion-
related emissions from equipment used for drilling and fracturing. As Figure 18 
shows, the most widely used chemical additives in hydraulic fracturing are 
hazardous air pollutants. Worsening air quality, as illustrated in Figure 21, ranks 
among the most frequent complaints of local residents affected by shale gas 
development [92]. 
 
Seismic activity Drilling and hydraulic fracturing activities may lead to low-
magnitude earthquakes [39, 59]. Two such seismic events were recently linked to 
shale gas exploration in the United Kingdom [46, 56], while similar incidents were 
reported in Texas in 2008 and 2009. The severity and probability of this hazard 
should be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis, depending on actual geology 
and specific local conditions.   
 
                                           
12 Legend:     Birds Directive sites,     Habitats Directive sites,     Sites - or parts of sites - belonging to 
both Directives; 
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Figure 21: Haze surroundings homes during hydraulic fracturing operations near 
Pavilion, Wyoming (left side) and Dimock, Pennsylvania (right side) 
  
Sources: http://wilderness.org/ http://marcelluseffect.blogspot.com/ 
 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions: With increasing attention being paid to the 
environmental footprint of shale gas, its comparative GHG intensity relative to 
other conventional and unconventional energies has emerged as a central point of 
discussion [15, 80, 105]. To date, there are only few studies on which GHG 
comparisons between shale gas and other energy forms can be based. Moreover, 
although such studies are interesting and potentially illustrative, wherever directly 
collected primary data were unavailable, reports so far have had to rely heavily on 
secondary data and educated guesswork. It is unclear to what extent information 
from studies based entirely on operational data might differ from these currently 
available estimates. There are several other points that will influence such GHG 
comparisons which are also important to consider:  
 The estimates of lifecycle GHG emissions may be significantly higher than 
estimates of direct, combustion-related emissions. The amount of “upstream” 
emissions will depend on the particular energy source and on the assumptions 
made for the upstream processes. 
 The time-horizon for calculating the global warming potential (GWP) of 
respective GHG emissions is similarly pivotal to any such comparisons. The key 
factor in determining the comparative GHG intensity of shale gas versus other 
energy forms is likely to be the potential differences in fugitive methane 
emissions at the extraction stage and after sites are abandoned. Methane has a 
much higher GWP over a short time horizon (20 years) compared to a longer 
time horizon (100 years). If a shorter time horizon is considered, the apparent 
GHG intensity of shale gas relative to the other energy carriers will be higher 
than if a longer time horizon is considered. There seems to be considerable 
uncertainty as to the magnitude of fugitive methane emissions associated with 
shale gas extraction, although these are thought to be higher than for 
conventional natural gas or coal extraction. 
 Comparisons of GHG emissions associated with energy derived from shale gas, 
conventional natural gas and coal will be influenced by the unit of comparison. 
Comparisons of GHG intensity of electricity generation must take conversion 
efficiencies into account. Since gas-fired stations typically have higher 
conversion efficiencies than coal-fired plants, a comparison on this basis will 
produce different ratios than would a comparison of GHG emissions for energy 
from direct combustion. 
 
Most available comparisons refer to conditions in the United States. It is difficult to 
assess the extent to which such analyses are representative of European 
conditions, given that technological and site-specific factors can vary widely within 
and across regions [2, 69]. Total gas production may be highly variable from well to 
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well over their economically exploitable lifetime, and well lifetimes will also differ 
[19, 29, 69]. The quality of construction and maintenance of shale gas facilities and 
infrastructure during and after extraction further adds to the potential variability in 
GHG performance. Poor construction, maintenance, operation or sealing of wells 
may result in substantial fugitive methane emissions [29, 92]. Making comparisons 
between studies is also confounded by differences in methodologies. For illustrative 
purposes, several such studies are discussed below.  
 
One recent study suggests that shale gas is among the most GHG-intensive fuels, 
performing better than coal only under the most optimistic set of assumptions [63] 
– Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22: Comparison of GHG emissions from shale gas, conventional natural 
gas, surface mined coal, deep (underground) mined coal and diesel oil over 20-and 
100-year time horizons [63] 
 
 
 
However, these conclusions appear to represent a specific and very unfavourable 
subset of potential US conditions [1, 87, 93]. Here, the apparently poor GHG 
performance of shale gas is due to assumed high fugitive emissions of methane of 
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between 3.6% and 7.9% of the total shale gas yield [63]. There are three ways of 
drastically reducing these emissions: 
 Flaring: methane that is brought to the surface during well development may 
be flared, converting it into CO2, which has a much lower global warming 
potential relative to methane; 
 Capture: releasing methane into the atmosphere represents a net loss of 
potential income for shale gas developers. Modern technologies are available 
that enable 90% of the methane that is brought to the surface in flowback 
water to be captured [63]. The incremental cost of these technologies may be 
offset by the income from the captured gas [1]. 
 Maintaining high quality standards of construction, maintenance and 
retirement of shale gas wells - proper cementing and sealing of retired wells - 
seems to be particularly important for reducing fugitive methane emissions [1, 
68, 92]. 
 
Another study, which assumed flaring or capture of fugitive methane, estimated the 
GHG balance of shale gas to be much closer to that of conventional natural gas – 
Figure 23. In the best-case scenario, shale gas emissions are estimated to be only 
3.5% higher than those of conventional natural gas, while in the worst case the 
excess amounts to 12% [68]. Under normal circumstances, it is not reasonable to 
expect the GHG performance of shale gas to equal that of conventional gas. In 
general, the greater number of wells necessary to extract the same amount of gas 
from shale deposits compared to conventional gas fields means that there is a 
proportionally greater risk of fugitive methane emissions.  
 
Figure 23: Well-to-Burner GHG emissions of natural gas [68] 
 
 
Some recent projections for GHG performance of shale (and tight) gas versus 
conventional natural gas and coal intended to represent potential European 
conditions are also available – Figure 24. These are broadly in agreement with the 
previously discussed study (Figure 23). Here, shale gas is estimated to be more 
GHG-intensive than conventional gas, but less intensive than coal – a conclusion 
that is generally borne out by most comparable analyses [69, 96]. It is interesting 
to note that under the most optimistic assumptions, shale gas from indigenous EU 
resources performs marginally better than conventional gas that is supplied via 
pipeline from remote locations13. The shale gas advantage results from the shorter 
distance of transportation by pipeline (500 km) and the better technical status of 
EU pipelines, where fugitive losses are minimal.  
 
 
                                           
13 In fact, this is Russian gas from Siberia. 
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Figure 24: GHG emissions of shale and tight gas production, distribution and 
combustion compared to conventional natural gas and coal, extrapolated to 
European conditions [29] (NG – natural gas) 
 
 
 
Summary: The environmental externalities of current extraction technologies for 
shale gas are attracting increased attention, and may undermine the potential 
viability of the industry. The most important environmental concerns (or potential 
drawbacks) of today’s shale gas production appear to be associated with water. 
These are: 1) Large freshwater demand; 2) Freshwater contamination, mostly with 
methane and fine particles; 3) Underground and surface pollution with hazardous 
chemicals, heavy metals or radioactive elements; 4) Wastewater handling, 
treatment and disposal. Other important potential environmental disadvantages of 
the industrial exploitation of shale gas are: 5) Impacts on biodiversity, in particular 
with regard to Natura 2000; 6) Worsened local air quality; and 7) Seismic concerns. 
The greenhouse gas performance of shale gas is generally poorer than that of 
conventional gas. This is largely due to fugitive methane emissions. There are cost-
efficient techniques, e.g. flaring and capturing that can significantly reduce these 
fugitive emissions. The sustainable management of environmental externalities of 
shale gas exploitation requires excellent knowledge of geology, prudent exploitation 
of shale gas deposits, full and complete disclosure of chemical components that are 
employed, cautious land-use planning, high building, operational and post-
operational conservation standards, and strict governmental control over 
operational safety and security. 
 31 
4. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SHALE GAS EXPLOITATION 
 
Many of the issues discussed thus far in terms of economic and environmental 
considerations may also be framed as social issues. These include land use conflicts 
associated with high population densities; state ownership of underground 
resources; and a range of important environmental externalities, including water 
availability, water pollution, wastewater handling, potential harms to biodiversity, 
worsened air quality and earthquake concerns. A range of other social dimensions, 
both positive and negative, also merit consideration. How these challenges are 
managed is likely to have a significant influence on the social acceptability of shale 
gas development in the EU.   
 
Such issues have become particularly important in the aftermath of the 2010 British 
Petroleum Deepwater Horizon and 2011 Fukushima incidents. The NIMBY (Not In 
My Back Yard) syndrome is likely to play an important role in negotiations as to the 
location and extent of shale gas developments. This will be particularly critical for 
regions where population densities are relatively high and alternative economic 
activities are available [55].  
 
Visual landscape disturbance: Like many other industrial processes, shale gas 
extraction has non-trivial landscape impacts – Figure 25. The extent of such 
disturbance is the subject of an ongoing debate, with proponents and opponents of 
shale gas development presenting extreme cases at either end of a representative 
continuum [87]. Despite new technological advances that reduce the number of 
well pads necessary to extract shale gas, the cumulative impacts on the landscape 
may still be substantial, especially in densely populated areas [77, 96]. The 
numbers and size of well sites, along with supporting infrastructure (roads, utility 
lines, pipelines, compressor stations, water lagoons, etc. – Figure 26), must be 
considered in terms of the aesthetic values and uses of the landscape, in particular 
tourism and agriculture. As described previously, the large size of shale gas fields 
suggests that their development will necessarily be distributed over correspondingly 
extensive areas. 
 
Figure 25: Aerial view of a shale gas well site in the Marcellus Shale Gas Field – 
house and nearby gas operations.  
      
Source: http://www.spectraenergywatch.com/ 
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Figure 26: Aerial views of different shale gas production sites that illustrate the 
pressure on local landscapes 
  
Sources: [21] http://www.ogfj.com/index.html 
 
 
 
Sources: http://www.ucsusa.org   http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/ 
 
Noise pollution: During the development phase of shale gas extraction, noise 
pollution may be significant, especially in relation to well-site construction, drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing operations [92, 96]. These activities also need to be 
supported by large-scale trucking services (Figure 27), which generate additional 
noise and air pollution, along with burdens on road infrastructure. 
 
Figure 27: A shale gas well site during a single hydraulic fracturing operation (New 
York State, 2009)14 [96] 
 
                                           
14 Legend: 1. Wellhead and frack tree with ‘Goat Head’; 2. Flow line for flowback & testing; 3. Sand 
separator for flowback; 4. Flowback tanks; 5. Line heaters; 6. Flare stack; 7. Pump trucks; 8. Sand 
hogs; 9. Sand trucks; 10. Acid trucks; 11. Frack additive trucks; 12. Blender; 13. Frack control and 
monitoring centre; 14. Fresh water impoundment; 15. Fresh water supply pipeline; 16. Extra tanks; 17. 
Line heaters; 18. Separator-metre skid; 19. Production manifold. 
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For example, large quantities of water, sand and waste streams need to be 
transported in order to support hydraulic fracturing operations. Figure 28 provides 
an estimate of the truck traffic required to support the development of a single 
shale gas well or an eight-well pad in the US. In Europe, the number of truck trips 
is likely to be higher, given the generally smaller size of the trucks used. The social 
importance of noise pollution will largely depend on the proximity of shale gas 
developments to populated areas, as well as competing and directly affected land 
uses, such as tourism.  
 
Figure 28: Truck journeys for a typical shale well drilling and completion site [77] 
Activity 1 rig, 1 well 2 rigs, 8 wells 
Pad and Road Construction 10-45 10-45 
Drilling Rig 30 60 
Drilling Fluid and Materials 25-50 200-400 
Drilling Equipment (casing, drill pipe, etc.) 25-50 200-400 
Completion Rig 5 30 
Completion Fluid and Materials 10-20 80-160 
Completion Equipment (pipe, wellhead, etc.) 5 10 
Fracturing Equipment (pump trucks, tanks, etc.) 150-200 300-400 
Fracture Water 400-600 3,200-4,800 
Fracture Sand 20-25 160-200 
Flow-back Water Disposal 200-300 1,600-2,400 
Total 890-1 340 5 850-8 905 
 
Socio-economic trade-offs: Besides these negative externalities, it is also important 
to consider whether or not shale gas exploitation will result in positive socio-
economic impacts, such as economic development, GDP/income growth or 
employment [23, 92]. Several studies on the employment benefits of shale gas 
development in the US have recently been published. Most of these are industry-
sponsored works and come up with rather optimistic conclusions [10, 65, 73, 91, 
118]. For this reason, however, quite a few of these studies have been criticised for 
their lack of peer review, objectivity and transparency, as well as on methodological 
grounds [57, 72, 116]. Several examples are provided below: 
 The Considine studies, commissioned by the Marcellus Shale Coalition (a specific 
interest group of shale gas producers), monitor and report on the socio-
economic benefits of the continuous development of the Marcellus shale gas 
field. The latest update from 2011 [10] claims that the Marcellus shale gas 
industry supported 140 000 jobs in 2010, rising to 156 000 in 2011 and 180  000 
in 2012. The study projects that, by 2020, the Marcellus field may support more 
than 250 000 jobs and generate USD 2 billion in State and local taxes and 
revenues per annum, up from USD 1.1 billion in 2010. The methodological basis 
of the Considine studies has been criticised on a number of fronts, including 
inappropriate assumptions about earning and spending percentages of lease and 
royalty payments by location and time, location of actual job creation 
(inside/outside the target areas), etc. [57, 72]. 
 A study by Wood Mackenzie, commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute 
[118], suggests that shale gas developments in the USA and Canada (if 
supported by policy) can generate more than 1 400 000 incremental jobs by 
2030, while incremental jobs may already exceed 1 000 000 by 2018. 
 Referring to data and information from Pennsylvania’s Department of Labor & 
Industry, ExxonMobile claims that the core industry employment in the 
Marcellus Shale grew by 114% between 2008 and 2011 [36]. 
 A recent study from IHS Global Insight [65], commissioned by America’s 
Natural Gas Alliance and available free of charge from the IHS Global Insight 
website, estimates that the US shale gas industry supported more than 600 000 
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jobs in 2010 - a number that may reach 870 000 by 2015 and 1 600 000 by 
2035. The estimated contribution to the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
in excess of USD 76.9 billion in 2010, and was projected to be 118.2 billion in 
2015, tripling to 231.1 billion by 2035. The US shale gas industry is claimed to 
act as a high “employment multiplier” – every direct shale gas job presumably 
generates more than three indirect or induced jobs elsewhere [64].  
 
Other studies on similar subjects, but from non-industry sources, have arrived at 
less optimistic conclusions:  
 A study by Ohio State University [116] suggests 20 000 gross incremental jobs 
compared, for example, to the 200 000 incremental jobs forecast by a Kleinhenz 
& Associates study on the economic impacts of shale gas in Ohio, commissioned 
by the Ohio Oil & Gas Energy Educational Program [73]. Net incremental 
employment would be even lower, as the 20 000 jobs figure did not take into 
account the displacement impacts, i.e. the number of jobs in other sectors (e.g. 
tourism, coal mining) that would be lost due to shale gas development. The 
university study also quotes estimates that, in 2010, the Pennsylvania natural 
gas industry (including shale gas) employed only 26 000 people, compared to 
some 400 000 people in tourism – a sector that could be seriously damaged by 
extensive shale gas developments. The university study further affirms that the 
overall employment benefits are moderate, given that shale gas is a capital-
intensive rather than labour-intensive industry, with most jobs being short-term 
and created mainly in the early stages of shale gas development. 
 The Public Policy Institute of New York State Inc. calculates that, on average, 
the shale gas industry generated 125 jobs per new well. In contrast, Food and 
Water Watch calculate that only two new jobs are generated per well drilled 
[91] for the same region and time period.  
 
In Europe, estimates of potential socio-economic benefits are understandably 
scarce. A study commissioned by Cuadrilla Resources (a shale gas industry 
stakeholder), presents estimates that are decidedly more conservative than those 
provided by US industry sources [85]. The net socio-economic benefits associated 
with shale gas development in EU Member States will be strongly influenced by the 
balance in trade-offs with competing and benefit-generating economic activities and 
land uses, such as agriculture. This will be particularly important for Member States 
with large agricultural sectors and/or with large numbers of people employed in 
agriculture as a share of total employment. Countries with relatively high 
population densities and/or low freshwater resources per capita may also face 
challenges in developing indigenous shale gas resources. Calculations of costs and 
benefits must carefully weigh up the allocation of these limited resources between 
competing activities and the attendant outcomes for employment and incomes.  
 
Summary: The socio-economic impacts of shale gas development should always be 
subject to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis, taking all 
direct and indirect consequences into account, whether these be positive or 
negative. Since there is currently no industrial-scale production of shale gas in the 
EU, coming up with any quantitative projections about the related potential socio-
economic impacts is extremely challenging. Direct extrapolation of the North 
American experience does not appear to be reliable, because of the considerable 
differences in geological, economic, social and regulatory conditions. Last but not 
least, it was difficult to find very many genuinely independent and reliable data 
sources, information and analyses of the social consequences of shale gas 
exploitation in the course of the study. 
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5. CLOSING REMARKS: THE PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS IN 
EUROPE 
 
Regardless of the economic, environmental and social challenges associated with 
current shale gas technologies and developments, shale gas - and unconventional 
gas in general - is increasingly expected to play an ever larger part in global gas 
supply [122] - Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29: Evolution of International Energy Agency projections for world gas 
supply, taking into account the development of unconventional gas reserves 
 
2009 Projections [66] 
 
2010 Projections [67]  
 
2011 Projections [68] 
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These developments will come in response to the rapid growth in the global 
demand for gas, driven primarily by developing countries [101]. According to the 
latest projections [68], the share of unconventional gas in world gas supplies will 
reach 24% by 2035, with shale gas - at 11% - being the largest unconventional 
contributor. Earlier, more moderate predictions suggested that the unconventional 
gas share would be 19% by 2035 [67], with shale gas contributing 7% by 2030 
[82]. These projections share the following common features:  
 They present a large degree of uncertainty; 
 Most additional shale gas development will take place in North America (USA 
and Canada) - the birthplace of the shale gas industry - and some energy-
hungry countries such as China and (eventually) India [68, 101]. According to 
some sources, Europe is not being seen as a large prospective shale gas player 
before 2035 [59, 75, 95], due to a number of techno-economic, environmental, 
social and political challenges, although in some EU Member States exploration 
activity is already significant. 
 
As discussed above, the existing diversity of supply options for natural gas and 
opportunities to expand current sources may indicate that there is less interest in 
developing indigenous shale gas deposits in the EU. Central to this determination 
will be the break-even costs for European shale gas resources relative to competing 
energy sources. Estimates to date are variable and highly uncertain, given the 
current lack of information on which to base EU-specific estimates. According to 
OECD-IEA projections, Europe can rely on abundant gas supply in the future at a 
cost of less than 3.0 USD/MBtu from Norway, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Iraq and the 
Caspian region – Figure 30. The most expensive conventional gas option – i.e. the 
Russian Arctic deposits in the Barents Sea - ranges from 7.5 to 8.0 USD/MBtu - 
Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30: Indicative costs of potential new sources of gas delivered to Europe, 
2020 (USD(2008)/MBtu) [66] 
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These figures are lower than some best case estimates for indigenous shale gas 
from Poland, which exceed 8.0 USD/MBtu – Figure 31. The high-end cost 
estimates for shale gas production in Europe tend towards 16.0 USD/Mbtu (Figure 
31) – a value that currently appears totally uncompetitive relative to all the 
alternative forms of natural gas deposits, not only in Europe, but also worldwide - 
Figure 32. It remains to be seen whether other forms of unconventional gas will 
prove more or less competitive than shale gas in the EU. A recent large-scale 
modelling effort from the European Commission Joint Research Centre – Institute 
for Energy and Transport, explores the potential impact of unconventional gas (in 
particular, shale gas) on European Union and global energy markets [123]. It was 
suggested that shale gas has the potential to extensively impact global gas 
markets, but only under very optimistic assumptions regarding production costs 
and reserves. 
 
Figure 31: Indicative costs for potential new sources of conventional natural gas 
deliveries to Europe versus development of indigenous shale gas deposits in 2020, 
USD/MBtu [59] 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Long-term natural gas supply cost curve estimate. Adapted from [66] 
 
 
EU? 
US? 
EU??? 
 38 
Similarly pivotal to the development of a European shale gas industry will be the 
issue of how to resolve key environmental and social concerns. Certain issues 
already facing the shale gas industry in North America may prove to be even more 
challenging in Europe due to higher population densities, tougher competition for 
land, water and other resources, and the heightened sensitivities of local 
populations to large-scale industrial developments. At the same time, effective 
regulatory regimes, the implementation of best practices and the introduction of 
new technologies to mitigate priority impacts may enable shale gas development 
that meets the requirements of competing stakeholders and sustainable 
development. A recent report from the International Energy Agency describes a set 
of “golden rules” to guide policy makers, regulators, and shale gas developers in 
managing the potential social and environmental impacts of shale gas development 
[122] 
 
In short, the future prospects for industrial–scale exploitation of shale gas reserves 
in Europe have still to be resolved. Alternatively, European energy companies may 
wish to consider ways of exploring shale gas opportunities beyond European 
borders, where the ecological and techno-economic conditions etc. are more 
favourable. European energy leaders (e.g. BP, TOTAL, SHELL) have already 
embarked on substantial shale gas acquisitions abroad [21, 53]. 
 
From the research point of view, the priority issues that need to be addressed in 
the EU in the short-to-medium term include: 
 Improved mapping of shale gas resources across Europe; 
 Determining the extent to which the application of best available 
technologies and practices can mitigate key environmental concerns with 
hydraulic fracturing, in particular as regards water use and pollution; 
 Determination of potential social and economic costs and benefits of shale 
gas development; 
 Determination of the overall economic feasibility of shale gas development 
when using best available technologies. 
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Abstract 
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